Reading entrepreneurial power in small Gulf states: Qatar and the UAE by Ennis, C.A.
Scholarly Essay
Reading entrepreneurial
power in small Gulf
states: Qatar and
the UAE
Crystal A. Ennis
Universiteit Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands
Abstract
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become crucial players in the Middle
East North Africa regional order. Few would have expected such a transformation even
20 years ago. This paper examines the constitution of Qatari and Emirati power.
It demonstrates how understanding the entrepreneurial power of states is central to
explanations of growth, strength, and position in regional and global orders. The analysis
argues that the entrepreneurial powerhood of Qatar and the UAE is constituted by
their development narrative and pursuit of status, which is facilitated by their material
capabilities and their governance style characterized by flexible autocracy.
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Even as recently as 20 years ago, few would have expected the small states of Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to be looked at as crucial players in the Middle East
North Africa (MENA) regional order. Fewer still would have predicted their promin-
ence and visibility on the global stage. How have these commodity producers been able
to extend their voice beyond their niche as energy suppliers? In this article, I explore the
puzzle of small, oil-wealthy, rentier states exerting entrepreneurial power in regional
and global aﬀairs. I demonstrate how entrepreneurial power in Qatar and the UAE has
been facilitated by the pursuit of status, the construction of compelling development
narratives, eﬀective branding, and ﬂexible autocratic governing.1
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1. Along with analysis of policy documents and secondary sources, this research was informed by
semi-structured interviews with 12 key interlocutors and numerous off-the-record meetings in
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha in October 2016.
The traditional assertion that small states are conﬁned to the margins of inter-
national relations has given way to evidence that many small states exert more
inﬂuence than their size suggests.2 In an era where global order is characterized
more by complexity and multifaceted governance interfaces than hierarchy and
unipolarity, a wider range of options exists for small nations. Some have been
able to capture globalizing forces for their own beneﬁt, and inﬂuence a multiplicity
of outcomes in the international order. Using two non-Western cases, Qatar and
the UAE, this article contributes to the expansion of global international relations
(IR), and demonstrates that understanding entrepreneurial power across a range of
places and sizes is critical to explanations of change, growth, strength, and position
in regional and global orders. It also illustrates how rivalry and distributions of
power within a region can impact the prospects for an entrepreneurial state.
Qatar and the UAE are two of six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), and sit in the core of the world’s largest oil-producing region. Qatar and
the UAE are among the top nine producers by proven reserves within the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which continues to be
inﬂuential in global oil markets.3 Qatar is also the largest producer and exporter of
liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG).
These states are best known for being wealthy, hydrocarbon producers, big
spenders domestically and internationally, and, chieﬂy, for being excessively
dependent on hydrocarbon rents. In fact, hydrocarbon earnings comprise 80.3%
and 63.5% of ﬁscal revenue in Qatar and the UAE, respectively.4 This dependence
on fossil fuels has structured development paths and modern state-building in
particular ways. Petro-fuelled development fostered rapid growth and striking
change, especially following the 1973 oil boom. While nurturing a security state
and a bloated public sector that functions as the chief employer of citizens, oil
wealth combined with authoritarianism have allowed Qatar and the UAE to
pursue mostly uninterrupted developmental agendas.
Scholarship on the region describes Qatar and the UAE as rentier states which
derive their legitimacy from their accumulation and redistribution of rent resources
among the domestic population. Most of these studies ignore both the agency of
citizens within the state and the agency of the state in the international order.5
2. Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1959); Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great
Powers (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), 181–189; Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, and
Sieglinde Gsto¨hl, Small States in International Relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2012); Yee-Kuang Heng and Syed Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied, ‘‘Can small states be more than
price takers in global governance?’’ Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and
International Organizations 21, no. 3 (2015): 435–454.
3. OPEC share of proven crude reserves, OPEC, 2017, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_
graphs/330.htm (accessed 4 October 2018).
4. ‘‘Economic diversification in oil-exporting Arab countries,’’ Annual Meeting of Arab Ministers of
Finance, International Monetary Fund, April 2016, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/
042916.pdf (accessed 4 October 2018), 13.
5. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State (New York: Routledge, 1987); Michael L.
Ross, ‘‘Does oil hinder democracy?’’ World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325–361; Matthew Gray,
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This is especially true of GCC countries. Energy exporters in the global political
economy are not expected to engage in the international system beyond these areas,
and like small states, are presumed to be price and norm takers, vulnerable states in
the international order.6 Conventionally, ‘‘tiny’’ states such as these have foreign
policies ‘‘determined ﬁrst of all by [a] need to survive as an independent entity.’’7
Today, survival extends to inﬂuence and the crafting of an entrepreneurial role.
I deﬁne entrepreneurial power as the extent to which states, regardless of size or
position in regional and global hierarchies, beneﬁt from a collection of conven-
tional and non-conventional sources of power, and galvanize said power to pursue
status, secure legitimacy, and inﬂuence outcomes in regional and global aﬀairs.
While rapid development certainly raised the visibility of Qatar and the UAE on
the global stage, it is the shaping of a narrative and the building of status that have
reinforced how these small, energy-rich states have engaged in entrepreneurial
powerhood. Indeed, status is a ‘‘key resource.’’8 Status-building and nation-
building in these cases are mutually constitutive.
Qatar and the UAE’s sources of power initially start with their economic cap-
abilities and, importantly, how these are used. Resource wealth alone is insuﬃcient.
Nation-building activities domestically and status-building activities at home and
abroad facilitate the ability to act entrepreneurially.
These patterns are explored in the pages that follow. First, I examine the sources
and uses of power. This is followed by a discussion of how economic development
stories are narrated and utilized as foundations of power in national building.
I then explore the practices of national branding and status-building. Finally, the
paper looks at the risks of failure in new power exercises. Examining the entrepre-
neurial powerhood of small states not only allows more analytic ﬂexibility than
Figure 1. Entrepreneurial powerhood in the Gulf.
‘‘A theory of ‘late rentierism’ in the Arab states of the Gulf,’’ Center for International and Regional
Studies Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Occasional Paper no. 7, 2011.
6. Mary Eugenia Charles, A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (London:
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), 13–15; Heng and Aljunied, ‘‘Can small states be more than
price takers’’; Hassan Al-Akim, ‘‘UAE policy toward the sub-regional powers,’’ Middle East
Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 19–23; Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, ‘‘Qatar and expanded
contours of small state diplomacy,’’ The International Spectator 46, no. 3 (2011): 113–128.
7. Sir Graham Boyce, ‘‘Qatar’s foreign policy,’’ Asian Affairs 44, no. 3 (2013): 367.
8. Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for
International Standing (Routledge, 2014), 2.
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ideas of ‘‘smallness’’ or middle powership, but also provides more precision in
examining diverse state behaviour.
By using the terminology of entrepreneurial power, we delink powerhood from
place in hierarchy, and can therefore look more holistically at ways that states,
regardless of economic or political size, can exercise power in the current global
order. Status, of course, has to do with hierarchy. Yet by looking at it outside of
this context we can speak more of a positionality as encompassing status and pos-
ition in contexts where clear hierarchies are not as obvious. What I am interested in
here is a discussion of the constitution of power and of actorness beyond the trad-
itional conﬁnes of hierarchy, and whether one is a great, middle, or small power.
This analysis thus suggests the entrepreneurial powerhood of Qatar and the UAE is
constituted by their development narrative and pursuit of status, which are facilitated
by their material capabilities and their governance style characterized by ﬂexible
autocracy. Understanding the apparent enigma of traditionally rentier states exercis-
ing entrepreneurial power advances scholarship on the current global complex
through enhancing our understanding of under-researched, non-Western sites and
sources of change. Moreover, it tells us more about what entrepreneurial power can
look like and become as the present and future of power continues to evolve.
Oil wealth, status, and reading power in non-Western places
Oil-wealthy, authoritarian states like GCC countries tend to be written oﬀ as mere
oil spots—interesting to International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship only for
their energy resources. There is a limited, albeit growing, body of scholarship that
has begun to engage the GCC within IR/IPE.9 Scholars who do examine the GCC
countries’ international activities tend to have regional expertise, while broader IR
scholarship rarely incorporates Gulf cases within comparative studies of power.
One wonders why oil-wealthy Gulf states are frequently omitted from discussions
of power, and whether this neglect is related to how such states interact in—or are
perceived in—the international order, or if it stems more from Western biases
about who should be taken seriously as an international actor. Smith makes this
argument when he suggests that market orientalism deﬁnes the way the Gulf’s
economies, like other emerging markets, have been discussed in Western discourse.
Drawing from Edward Said, emerging markets can be seen as ‘‘imaginative geo-
graphies’’—that is, they are ‘‘spaces that are ranked, structured, theorised,
assembled, and sometimes punished in ways inseparable from earlier forms of
dealing with supposedly ‘backward’ economies and peoples.’’10 Despite broad
9. Matteo Legrenzi and Bessma Momani, Shifting Geo-Economic Power of the Gulf: Oil, Finance and
Institutions (London & New York: Ashgate, 2011); Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Gulf States in
International Political Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Matthew Gray, Qatar:
Politics and the Challenges of Development (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013); David B.
Roberts, Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State (London: Hurst & Company, 2017).
10. Benjamin Smith, Market Orientalism: Cultural Economy and the Arab Gulf States (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2015), 9.
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acknowledgement that traditional analysis focused on great powers is outdated, IR
scholarship continues to look at the Western world or North Atlantic for its
examples and theory building.11 Against this backdrop, critique of Western dom-
inance in IR has led to calls for non-Western IR, post-Western IR, or global IR.12
However, many of these new introductions remain limited to the BRICS, East
Asia, or ‘‘large’’ states.
Writing about politics and international relations in the Middle East is always a
delicate endeavour. The author needs to struggle against many prevailing dis-
courses. Sifting through the knowledge produced on the region is crucial in discus-
sions of power politics. As Lockman has shown, the production of Western
knowledge on the region has gone hand-in-hand with the production and repro-
duction of power structures, inﬂuencing interpretations of the Middle East until
today.13 Moreover, public policy and media debates have overtaken genuine schol-
arly interest in the region, inﬂuencing the types of questions addressed in academic
institutions. The Gulf is arguably one of the last bastions of overt orientalism,
where the scholar, journalist, and local expert reproduce and reinforce certain
images of the region as though these were unproblematic. Called a ‘‘glittering
sandbar’’14 or an ‘‘adult Disneyland,’’15 a rising Qatar or UAE are amusements
of press analysis, described as nations punching above their weight, meddling in
regional aﬀairs, or struggling to ﬁll a power vacuum left by a less-engaged United
States.16 In academic analysis, the Gulf remains ‘‘traditional,’’17 a place where
11. David C. Kang, ‘‘Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations,’’
International Security 28, no. 3 (2004): 165–180; Amitav Acharya, ‘‘Global international relations
(IR) and regional worlds,’’ International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–159.
12. Acharya, ‘‘Global international relations’’; Ching-Chang Chen, ‘‘The absence of non-Western IR
theory in Asia reconsidered,’’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23;
Nicolas Blarel and Niels Van Willigen, ‘‘Coalitions and foreign-policy-making: Insights from the
Global South,’’ European Political Science 16, no. 4 (2016): 502–514; Oliver Stuenkel,
Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2016); Giorgio Shani, ‘‘Toward a post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and critical
international relations theory,’’ International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 722–734.
13. Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism,
2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
14. Robert Fulford, ‘‘Welcome to Qatar, the sandbar nation that hearts Hamas,’’ National Post, 9
August 2014, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/robert-fulford-welcome-to-qatar-the-
sandbar-nation-that-hearts-hamas (accessed 4 October 2018).
15. Johann Hari, ‘‘The dark side of Dubai,’’ The Independent, 6 April 2009, http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/voices/commentators/johann-hari/the-dark-side-of-dubai-1664368.html (accessed 4
October 2018).
16. Theunis Bates, ‘‘Qatar: The tiny nation that roared,’’ The Week, 21 September 2013, http://the
week.com/articles/459776/qatar-tiny-nation-that-roared (accessed 4 October 2018); Mark
Mazzetti, C.J. Chivers, and Eric Schmitt, ‘‘Taking outsize role in Syria, Qatar funnels arms to
rebels,’’ The New York Times, 29 June 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/mid
dleeast/sending-missiles-to-syrian-rebels-qatar-muscles-in.html (accessed 4 October 2018).
17. J.E. Peterson, ‘‘The GCC states: Participation, opposition and the fraying of the social contract,’’
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, Research
Paper no. 26, December 2012, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55258/1/Peterson_2012.pdf (accessed 4
October 2018).
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‘‘sameness prevails,’’18 and ‘‘where a narrow circle of academic specialists’’ relies
on ‘‘simplistic theories’’ of rentierism, religion, and tribalism to explain the
region.19 The prominence, rapid development, and growing metropolises of Abu
Dhabi, Doha, and Dubai are juxtaposed against traditional clothing, culture, or
religious practice. This tendency not only exoticizes the region, it obfuscates the
rather mundane practices of statecraft and policymaking that occur across time
and space. Thus, when interpreting and explaining power and politics of the Gulf,
one must sift through a vast number of reproducing cliche´s that do little to advance
understandings and engage our capacities for critical scholarship.
The remainder of this section sets up the discussion of entrepreneurial power in
Qatar and the UAE, discussing its sources and uses through the illustration in
Figure 1, introduced earlier.
Understanding sources of power in Qatar and the UAE
Qatar and the UAE are not powers in the traditional, realist sense of large, power-
ful states with extensive and eﬀective coercive, hard power. Yet their inﬂuence and
reach is certainly more expansive than traditional conceptions would project.
Barnett and Duval’s deﬁnition of power as ‘‘the production, in and through
social relations, of eﬀects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their
circumstances and fate’’ informs this analysis.20 Building from this, I regard entre-
preneurial power as linked to a choice of behaviour that aims to shape perceptions
and outcomes.21 With a view of power as inclusive of various types and stemming
from various sources,22 a conceptualization of these small Gulf states as powerful
actors in their own right is possible—even where many would expect them to be
overshadowed by a much larger regional hegemon, Saudi Arabia. As petro-wealthy
states, material capabilities underwrite their position and possibilities for inter-
national engagement. However, this alone is an insuﬃcient explanation. Not all
oil-wealthy nations wield inﬂuence in the same way. Rather, the entrepreneurial
powerhood of these actors is also constituted by social relations, behaviour, and
activities.23 The novelty or innovativeness of their pursuits is crucial to the entre-
preneurial characterization.
Exercises of power in Qatar and the UAE have been characterized as soft, smart,
or subtle. Most realist literature assumes small states are preoccupied with their
18. Miriam Cooke, Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf (University of California
Press, 2014), 5.
19. Adam Hanieh, ‘‘A petrodollar and a dream: Any reversal of neoliberalism in the Middle East
would require challenging powerful Gulf States,’’ Jacobin, 12 January 2014, https://www.jacobin
mag.com/2014/01/a-petrodollar-and-a-dream/ (accessed 4 October 2018).
20. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘‘Power in international politics,’’ International
Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 42.
21. This draws from the definition articulated by Ravenhill, in this issue.
22. Barnett and Duvall, ‘‘Power in international politics.’’
23. As Wendt suggests, the objective of constitutive theories ‘‘is to account for the properties of things
by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist.’’ Alexander Wendt, ‘‘On constitution
and causation in international relations,’’ Review of International Studies 24, no. 5 (1998): 105.
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vulnerability in the international system, and will either bandwagon or balance
against larger powers. Instead, several authors show how both states pursue a
policy of strategic hedging—often referring to the propensity of small states in
the region to maintain cordial relations with Iran while still looking to the US as
the security guarantor.24 Kamrava extends this, suggesting that Qatar’s power is
based on a mixture of hedging along with forming alliances and norm entrepre-
neurship.25 He demonstrates how hedging, through policies of dominance-
denial and limited balancing, serves as a way for small states to maintain security
assurances against multiple threats while remaining globally engaged. He calls the
combined result of US military protection, massive international investments, and
active, visible diplomatic leadership achieved through ‘‘aggressive branding and
diplomatic hedging’’ a new form of power—subtle power.26 Likewise, Cooper
and Momani label Qatar a smart power, arguing that it is a resilient and innovative
diplomatic actor, representative of the increased ﬂexibility aﬀorded to small states
in the current international order.27 Ulrichsen uses soft, smart, and hard power in
his overview of the UAE’s power politics, and like Almezaini, believes the UAE’s
economic and diplomatic strength underscore its foreign policy clout.28 These con-
ceptualizations are important because they have given more agency to small states
than is traditionally aﬀorded to them. When scholarship looks at certain smaller
states as objects rather than actors in the international order, we lose some insights
on what makes the contemporary world ‘‘hang’’ together.29
Economic capabilities underwrite the entrepreneurial power of Qatar and the
UAE, and allow them to construct their image and legitimacy at home and abroad.
What brings them together analytically is their interest in building their status
regionally and internationally, and having their development achievements and
inﬂuence recognized by the international community. Callen calls Qatar’s path
‘‘the broadcaster,’’ and the UAE’s path ‘‘the haven.’’30 The primary distinction
is that, while both require state-branding and policies designed to attract foreign
capital, the broadcaster approach seeks to use this capital (both ﬁnancial and
political) to project inﬂuence externally, while the haven approach is more
24. Yoel Guzansky, ‘‘The foreign-policy tools of small powers: Strategic hedging in the Persian Gulf,’’
Middle East Policy 22, no. 1 (2015): 112–122; Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics
(Cornell University Press, 2013) The applicability of this has weakened with uncertainty around
the reliability of the US as a partner and guarantor, and the tense relations between Abu Dhabi,
Riyadh, and Tehran.
25. Kamrava, Qatar, 49.
26. Ibid., 12.
27. Cooper and Momani, ‘‘Qatar and expanded contours of small state diplomacy.’’
28. Khalid S. Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid, Identities and Interests (New
York: Routledge, 2012), 49–50; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power,
Politics and Policy-Making (New York: Routledge, 2016).
29. Phrasing borrowed from John G. Ruggie’s influential article, ‘‘What makes the world hang
together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge,’’ International Organization
52, no. 4 (1998): 855–885.
30. David J. Callen, ‘‘The diversification of (in)security in 21st century UAE and Qatar: Cultivating
capital, interdependence and uncertainty’’ (PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 2015), http://
search.proquest.com/docview/1654441217?pq-origsite=gscholar (accessed 4 October 2018).
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concerned with internal stability and further development. Likewise, Soubrier sug-
gests that the UAE has built a security strategy on its credibility and state-building,
while Qatar pursues state-branding through international visibility.31 This is a
useful distinction to explain behaviour in the 1990s and 2000s, but narrows in
the period since. My research revealed that the UAE leverages its reputation as
a reliable partner to exert international inﬂuence. Thus, both paths look outward.
It is not without consequence that the UAE has spent more decades building up its
military capabilities than Qatar, which relied longer on security assurances from
the US, and balanced these with partners like France.32
A combination of factors spurred the active engagement of small Gulf states like
Qatar and the UAE in regional aﬀairs. The decline of traditional regional powers like
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which are embroiled in resolving domestic instabilities, state
collapse, or wars, provided an opportunity for GCCmembers to intervene in domestic
politics in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya.33 Moreover, American
abandonment of traditional US allies like Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt
during the Arab Spring, combined with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with
Iran, and the US discourse on its pivot to Asia policy during the Obama years,
contributed to a perception that the US was a less-interested or less-reliable partner
in areas outside counterterrorism. This heightened a sense that local actors would have
to take a more active regional role to secure desired outcomes. Where the states
diverge is how they leverage their reputational strengths and select the means to
pursue independent foreign policy goals. The divergence has become especially appar-
ent since 2011, when Qatar laid its bets with the regional change narrative of the Arab
Spring while the UAE (like Saudi Arabia) actively reinforced a continuance of the
regional status quo. Relations with the US have become even more uncertain under
the Trump administration’s foreign policy incoherence.
The loud rupture of diplomatic relations between Qatar and several Middle
East states (culminating with the blockade of Qatar in June 2017) brought long-
simmering tensions to the fore. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opposed
many of Qatar’s activities since the uprisings, rejecting what they perceive as sup-
port for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. Qatar views the attack
as a matter of sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy.34 2017 was not the ﬁrst
time relations between GCC members were strained. In 2014, Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and Bahrain pulled their ambassadors from Doha, in a move viewed as an
expression of dissatisfaction with Qatar’s unwillingness to assent to Saudi and
Emirati positions. In 2002, Saudi Arabia also withdrew its ambassador for a
31. Emma Soubrier, ‘‘Evolving foreign and security policies: A comparative study of Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates,’’ in Khalid S. Almezaini and Jean-Marc Rickli, The Small Gulf States:
Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring (New York: Routledge, 2016),
123–143.
32. Ibid., 130.
33. Almezaini and Rickli, The Small Gulf States, 186.
34. ‘‘Sheikh Tamim: Any talks must respect Qatar sovereignty,’’ Al Jazeera, 22 June 2017, http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/sheikh-tamim-talks-respect-qatar-sovereignty-170721184815
998.html (accessed 4 October 2018).
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ﬁve-year period over Al Jazeera’s coverage of the country. Saudi–Qatari tensions
have a long history, no more ﬂagrant than in the 1990s, with border skirmishes and
the 1996 implication of Saudi Arabia in an attempted counter-coup against Sheikh
Hamad to reinstall his father.35 Indeed, it is the independent foreign policies of
Sheikh Hamad that have most aggravated the Saudis. Given its regional weight,
Saudi Arabia views itself as the natural GCC leader and expects others to be
followers—a formulation resented by most GCC members. Indeed, the small
Gulf states regularly fail to follow, and instead disrupt Saudi policy goals. That
the UAE appears to be following Saudi Arabia ‘‘may not be so much following a
leader as ﬁnding themselves in step with a leader because of complementary inter-
ests.’’36 The joint opposition to Qatar thus illuminates both a recent—but perhaps
temporary—Saudi–UAE rapprochement and the underlying economic competition
between the UAE and Qatar.37 How competition interacts with the mobilization of
sources of entrepreneurial power, and risks failure, is explored in the last sections.
Interpreting the uses of power
Wedged between much larger regional actors Saudi Arabia and Iran, and accus-
tomed to the patronage and security relationships with Great Britain and the
United States, Qatar and the UAE spent the early days of modern state-building
conscious of their vulnerability in the international system. They became accus-
tomed to establishing and maintaining good relations with external actors.
Particularly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the beneﬁts of small
states increasing ‘‘their importance to as many powerful external partners as pos-
sible’’ became more apparent.38 Global ﬁnancial engagement was an ideal avenue
for this. Home to small populations, Qatar and the UAE, like their GCC neigh-
bours, have traditionally had limited absorptive capacity for oil rent reinvestment
domestically, and instead have engaged their capital account—purchasing foreign
assets, buying oﬃcial liabilities like US treasury bills, and investing in international
ﬁnancial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).39
Inﬂated oil prices during the 2000s augmented the UAE and Qatar’s further
engagement in the global economy. For instance, Qatar looked to long-term
LNG export agreements (particularly with the UK and China) to increase its inter-
dependency. Both countries’ oil and gas proﬁts were often invested through oﬃcial
35. Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 237–239. For more details on earlier disputes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, see
Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar (Taylor & Francis, 1979), 80–90.
36. Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, ‘‘Bound to follow?
Leadership and followership in the Gulf conflict,’’ Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 3 (1991): 397.
37. Mehran Kamrava, ‘‘The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution,’’ Orbis 56, no. 1 (2012):
96–104; Karen E. Young, The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United
Arab Emirates: Between the Majlis and the Market (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014);
Roberts, Qatar.
38. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 41.
39. Bessma Momani, ‘‘The oil-producing Gulf states, the IMF and the International Financial Crisis,’’
World Economics 10, no. 1 (2009): 15.
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state investment authorities, such as Abu Dhabi’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, the Abu
Dhabi Investment Authority (1976),40 and the much younger Qatar Investment
Authority (QIA) (2006). The QIA targeted high-proﬁle investments in Europe
and the EU, including Credit Suisse, the London Stock Exchange, Sainsbury’s,
and Nasdaq, among others.41 The 2000s also saw Gulf global investments and
acquisitions become the subject of widening global attention.
Foreign aid proceeded similarly. Gulf governments have gained reputations as
generous donors over the past four or ﬁve decades.42 Since the 1970s, the UAE has
been the third largest aid donor among Arab countries. Foreign aid facilitated the
UAE’s prominence in the Arab League and other regional and international organ-
izations.43 Qatar and the UAE use aid as a tool to expand inﬂuence, and also allow
political interests to inﬂuence aid.44
Agency is an important part of the story of small states asserting themselves
globally. Forming alliances is one component, but submissive cooperation is not
the only option. As Momani has shown, Gulf governments chose not to come to
the rescue of the West and bolster IMF ﬁnances during the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis,
partly in response to local concerns that investment should increase domestically,
and partly because it was clear that Gulf funding would not be reciprocated with
increased voice at the IMF executive board.45 That Gulf states took a less collab-
orative position illustrates a desire for the region to have a larger formal role in
global economic governance.
Indeed, Qatar and the UAE, despite being small, unlikely actors, have been able
to assert their voice in a wide range of global engagements. Through a combination
of diplomacy, branding, and the galvanization of economic resources toward par-
ticular ends, these states have wielded entrepreneurial power in a variety of fora.
The two have accomplished this in the shadow of a much larger regional player,
Saudi Arabia, and in spite of a recurrent rivalry with each other.
Narrating development and power
That Qatar and the UAE have developed rapidly and extraordinarily over the past
several decades is by now well established.46 This impressive growth has raised their
40. Rawi Abdelal, ‘‘Sovereign wealth in Abu Dhabi,’’ Geopolitics 14, no. 2 (2009): 317–327.
41. Gawdat Bahgat, ‘‘Energy as a main driver of Qatari foreign policy,’’ Comillas Journal of
International Relations, no. 5 (2016): 27.
42. Bessma Momani and Crystal A. Ennis, ‘‘Between caution and controversy: Lessons from the Gulf
Arab states as (re-)emerging donors,’’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2012):
605–627.
43. Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy, 52, 92.
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respective visibility and status globally, laying the groundwork for the construction
of powerful development narratives. These narratives are used to shape and build
identity and status at home and abroad. We cannot, in fact, view international
status-seeking as separate from the pursuit of domestic legitimation.
Part of this trajectory can be tied to active, visionary leadership that has been
eﬀective in galvanizing the bulk of the citizenry behind a shared vision and sense of
nationhood. Contestation certainly exists, but as the decades move forward, citi-
zens increasingly identify with being an Emirati or being a Qatari. The story of
Emirati and Qatari development—how it was rapid, sweeping, and guided by wise
leadership—is central to conceptualizations of the two countries today.
Abdulla eﬀectively discusses how ‘‘international society is the product of nation-
states’ ‘identity construction,’ constantly and actively produced through a state’s
decision-making apparatus.’’47 He demonstrates how the leadership of Sheikh
Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, in leading this process, was instrumental in the for-
mation and consolidation of the Emirati federation.48 Ruling elite often underline a
connection between development and leadership, and take centre stage in most
development stories. This is not unusual; authoritarian legitimacy globally is
often tied to pivotal individuals. Nation-building coalesces around development
narratives, strengthening legitimacy and fuelling international image construction
used in state-branding and status-seeking activities.
The Qatari case illustrates this well. Its modern political story is a story of the
Al-Thanis, and the story of Qatar’s rise is very much interweaved with a story of
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.49 When Sheikh Hamad came to power in a
coup against his father in 1995, he embraced a bolder approach in shaping the
nation and putting Qatar on the world map. He raised Qatar’s international proﬁle
through mediation, sports, and broadcasting, in a way that has been characterized
as ‘‘very much a personal vision.’’50 Under Hamad, Qatar became known as a
small yet powerful state that would forge an independent path. This vision was
also embraced in the narrative of the transfer of power to then 33-year-old crown
prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, following his father’s abdication on
25 June 2013. This move was widely reported to be the ﬁrst transfer of power from
father to son without a death or coup d’e´tat in the modern history of the region’s
monarchies. Sheikh Hamad stepped aside to let his son, born at the top side of the
millennial generation, rule. The telling of this moment naturally melded into the
constructed image of Qatar as a forward-looking nation, capitalizing on geopolit-
ical and geo-economic change, and responding to the demographic gravities of a
region with a youth-heavy demographic proﬁle.
47. Ghaith A. Abdulla, ‘‘The making of UAE foreign policy: A ‘dynamic process model,’’’ The
Emirates Occasional Papers, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi,
2014, 7.
48. The UAE was established in 1971. Sheikh Zayed is regarded as the founding father of the
federation.
49. Roberts, Qatar.
50. Boyce, ‘‘Qatar’s foreign policy,’’ 367.
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Individual members of Al-Nahyan, Al-Maktoum, and Al-Thani families are
well known, and written about frequently in the local press in a way that connects
their activities with the progress or development of the nation. It is common to
have commissioned biographies or even autobiographies sketching the history and
role of a ruling personality in national development.
Institutions signiﬁcant to the development of each country are frequently insep-
arable from members of ruling families, underlining how powerful elite agency can
be under autocratic conditions. For example, the Qatar Foundation is indivisible
from its patron Sheikha Moza, mother of Sheikh Tamim. Although private and
non-proﬁt in name, QF is very much a state-led organization spearheading Qatar’s
eﬀorts at building itself into a regional and global leader in education, science, and
cultural development.51 In another sector, Mubadala, Abu Dhabi’s state-owned
enterprise serving as a massive investment vehicle and developer, is strongly con-
nected with Mohamed bin Zayed, crown prince of Abu Dhabi. Although
Mubadala was only established in 2002, it quickly came to be viewed as a reliable
investment company, receiving AA ratings from Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s,
and Fitch by 2008.52 These represent just two examples of the many state bodies
and initiatives across economic, political, and cultural spectrums, whose existence
and activities are intricately tied to the ruling families of each state. The nature of
the state combined with this mode of operation and embeddedness of the state in
the economy facilitates both fast decision-making and implementation, unhindered
by democratic deliberation.53
This high level of elite agency is coupled with widespread recitation of elite
accomplishments. Without prompting, the names of ruling family members and
their critical roles in various sectors and activities were frequently mentioned in
interviews and informal conversations during this research. Inspiring broad con-
sensus around the story of development aids in drawing support toward shared
visions of the future. The role(s) of elites and especially rulers have become part
and parcel of the story of development and how that story is communicated.
Rulers frequently use their platform to appeal to a national consciousness,
encouraging individuals to work toward continued, shared development, and inter-
national status. Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim regularly speaks of the responsibilities
of citizens toward the state, society, and the economy.54 In his words, a citizen
‘‘bears an additional duty of advancing the work and being proud of it to realise its
51. Crystal A. Ennis, ‘‘Between trend and necessity: Top-down entrepreneurship promotion in Oman
and Qatar,’’ The Muslim World 105, no. 1 (2015): 116–138; Hiba Khodr, ‘‘The specialized cities of
the Gulf Cooperation Council: A case study of a distinct type of policy innovation and diffusion,’’
Digest of Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (2012): 149–177.
52. Abdelal, ‘‘Sovereign wealth in Abu Dhabi,’ 323–324.
53. Martin Hvidt, ‘‘The Dubai model: An outline of key development-process elements in Dubai,’’
International Journal of Middle East Studies 41, no. 3 (2009): 402–403.
54. 3, ,
3 November 2015, http://www.qna.org.qa/News/15110309000012/; ‘‘HH the Emir inaugurates
Advisory Council 45th Ordinary Session,’’ Qatar News Agency, 1 November 2016, https://
web.archive.org/web/20170421024135/http://www.qna.org.qa/en-us/News/16110109240019/HH-
the-Emir-Inaugurates-Advisory-Council-45th-Ordinary-Session (accessed 4 October 2018).
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mission in serving the community and the State.’’55 Likewise, speeches by
Mohamed bin Zayed are peppered with such calls:
We are now in a new stage in which our nation is continuing to establish its position in
both regional and international arenas. This stage requires every citizen to do their
best and cooperate with their fellow citizens in order for our progress and develop-
ment to continue and for our nation to be among the greatest in the world.56
This type of behaviour is viewed by Parkinson and Harding as part of entrepre-
neurial spaces (in their case, cities), where the process of economic transformation,
and motivating participation in this process, are important factors for ﬁnding a
place in a global economy. In such spaces, public, private and voluntary sectors
develop a vision around development, ‘‘devise appropriate structures for imple-
menting this vision and mobilise both local and non-local resources to pursue it.’’57
Constructing entrepreneurialism, therefore, starts internally and spreads out-
ward. Ruling elites intend to galvanize nationals around developmental aims, inter-
national acclaim, and ideas of citizenship as contribution and individual hard
work. Highlighting the importance of ‘‘personal commitment, dedication and a
strong work ethic,’’ the UAE’s development Vision 2021 claims that ‘‘at the
heart of every Emirati’s ambition is a profound awareness of duty towards their
nation.’’58 Kanna, writing on Dubai, suggests that ‘‘being a good neoliberal and
national subject means seeing oneself as a sort of creative artist of identity, extract-
ing useful and (allegedly) progressive aspects of ascriptive identity and reframing
them through neoliberal values of entrepreneurialism, individualism, and cultural
ﬂexibility.’’59
The outward angle is connected to global reputation-building and status-seek-
ing. This, as shown later, lays the groundwork for foreign policy aspirations and
interventions to be taken seriously by the international community. National image
is signiﬁcant for shaping how business professionals and policymakers from the
world’s leading cities and nations perceive a place. Thus, international branding
can be useful for supporting economic and political goals.60 In the last decade or
55. ‘‘HH the Emir inaugurates Advisory Council 45th Ordinary Session.’’
56. Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, ‘‘Statement by Mohamed Bin Zayed on the occasion of the 43rd
anniversary of the UAE National Day,’’ Crown Prince Court, 1 December 2014, https://
www.cpc.gov.ae/en-us/mediacenter/Pages/Speeches_Details.aspx?SP_Id=14 (accessed 4 October
2018).
57. Michael Parkinson and Alan Harding, ‘‘European cities toward 2000: Entrepreneurialism, com-
petition and social exclusion,’’ in Martin Rhodes, ed., The Regions and the New Europe: Patterns
in Core and Periphery Development (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1995), 67.
58. UAE Vision 2021 Summary (Abu Dhabi, 2010), https://www.vision2021.ae/sites/default/files/uae-
vision2021-brochure-english.pdf, 4.
59. Ahmed Kanna, Dubai: The City As Corporation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2011), 151.
60. William Coombe and Jad Melki, ‘‘Global media and Brand Dubai,’’ Place Branding and Public
Diplomacy 8, no. 1 (2012): 58–71; Khalid Hafeez et al., ‘‘The role of place branding and image in
the development of sectoral clusters: The case of Dubai,’’ Journal of Brand Management 23, no. 4
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two, nearly everyone with global media access would have encountered commer-
cials advertising one or more aspect of the UAE and Qatar. Successful branding,
especially in Dubai, has not only been a boon for traditional clusters like trade,
tourism, and logistics, but has had a positive spill-over eﬀect on other sectors.
The active, aggressive nature of the UAE and Qatar towards building a global
public image has moved the small nations from near obscurity to fame in the global
public eye.61
Across both cases, eﬀorts toward mobilizing local resources around shared
visions of development and capitalist work ethic are also cautiously combined
with references to a shared vision of culture, religion, and heritage. Rulers have
found it important to speak to these in the face of rapid development and urban
change which appears to erode all three. This is the narration of a liberal Arab
society that shares norms and values with the North Atlantic, but also remains
embedded within socially important ideas of heritage, culture, and faith. This
balancing between the push toward hyper-modernity and ideas of cultural authen-
ticity has become signiﬁcant in shaping narratives of Gulf development.
With the embrace of these narratives, ‘‘state status-seeking has a direct and
positive bearing on that state’s domestic legitimation.’’62 Is this, then, just another
tool for autocratic, yet developmental, regimes to secure regime longevity? It does
ring peculiar that autocratic states supposedly shaped by the rentier social contract
would stress reforms, developments, and liberal portrayals in the international
arena that may give mixed messages on individual empowerment in the domestic
one. Jones views this behaviour in the UAE as a form of liberal social engineering
in an illiberal state. According to her, ‘‘a new symbolism is being devised and
projected to the people, and lavish state spectacles are proclaiming these changes
to the world.’’63
This ﬁts with ﬁndings of scholarship on small-state status-seeking, which suggest
that status-seeking is both ‘‘a sub-category of state identity politics’’ and a way that
a state locates itself on the global political map.64 It should not only be understood
as a means of capturing agendas, or in the case of the Gulf states, prolonging
authoritarianism. Rather these processes operate symbiotically, whereby domestic
narratives interact with status-seeking ones at the global level, to paint a particular
developmental image—states with open economies, forward-looking leaders, and
dynamic societies pursuing globalization and growth while remaining rooted in
tradition.
(2016): 383–402; Simon Anholt, ‘‘Why brand? Some practical considerations for nation branding,’’
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 2, no. 2 (2006): 97–107.
61. Coombe and Melki, ‘‘Global media and Brand Dubai.’’
62. Carvalho and Neumann, Small State Status Seeking, 5.
63. Calvert W. Jones, ‘‘Seeing like an autocrat: Liberal social engineering in an illiberal state,’’
Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (2015): 27.
64. Carvalho and Neumann, Small State Status Seeking, 5.
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Building the national brand and making an international mark
Status-building and national branding allow the state to explain itself to the world,
as well as re-imagine its own position and identity at home.65 Development nar-
ratives domestically and positioning and marketing globally are deeply intertwined
in the making of entrepreneurial power. Qatar and the UAE have challenged usual
assumptions of small states’ options, by pursuing and sometimes achieving both
autonomy and inﬂuence.66 Both strive to escape the shadow of Saudi Arabia,
although they have gone through periods of bandwagoning with it—most illustra-
tively Qatar before Sheikh Hamad, and the UAE today (at least temporarily)
mending fences in its joint opposition to Qatari regional activities. As Figure 1
illustrates, nation-building and status-building work together to facilitate inﬂuence
in regional and global policy spaces. The goals include achieving legitimacy and
inﬂuence. The course is two-pronged.
1. Establish status through image of reliability.
2. Leverage status for desired outcomes.
Alongside these, status competition and alternative foreign policy visions between
these actors have given rise to attempts at undermining the legitimacy or status of
the other. This section shows the interconnection between national brand-making
and international mark-making.
Part of establishing status through an image of reliability is achieved by
heightening the attractiveness of domestic markets to foreign and domestic capital.
Creating enclaves for easy foreign investment and business activities—special eco-
nomic zones—has been instrumental. These free zones are essentially special regu-
latory spaces whereby foreign companies can establish operations in an
infrastructure-ready, tax-free, and tariﬀ-free environment that allows full foreign
ownership. Free zones were pioneered in the region by Dubai with the Jebel Ali
Free Zone in the mid-1980s, but have expanded to include Dubai International
Financial Centre, Dubai Media City, and Dubai Internet City, among others.67
Free zones in Doha include Qatar Science and Technology Park, and the quasi-free
zone Qatar Financial Centre.
Opportunities for consumption-driven economic activities are another dimen-
sion of national branding. The concept of ‘‘brand as nation’’ oﬀers ‘‘a modicum of
control in an uncertain, fast-paced, and competitive global marketplace’’ that
entails ‘‘living the brand,’’ and forms ‘‘a consumerist form of nationalism.’’68
This includes increasing domestic consumption and entertainment—the
65. Sue Curry Jansen, ‘‘Designer nations: Neo-liberal nation branding – Brand Estonia,’’ Social
Identities 14, no. 1 (2008): 122.
66. Soubrier, ‘‘Evolving foreign and security policies,’’ 125.
67. Christopher Davidson, ‘‘The emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai: Contrasting roles in the inter-
national system,’’ Asian Affairs 38, no. 1 (2007): 39–40.
68. Zala Volcic and Mark Andrejevic, ‘‘Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism,’’
International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 603.
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development of large retail spaces (ever-expanding and multiplying malls), restaur-
ants, and places for cultural consumption, including museums and opera houses
that feature domestic and foreign entertainment and exhibits.
The practice of joining elite clubs of global governance and raising visibility in
important global issue areas is a feature of shaping an image of Emirati and Qatari
entrepreneurial powerhood. Energy governance, aviation, and high-proﬁle invest-
ments and political engagements have been central. Larson and Schevenchko show
how states ‘‘may improve their status by joining elite clubs, trying to best the
dominant states, or achieving pre-eminence outside the arena of geopolitical com-
petition.’’69 Qatar and the UAE frequently pursue activities like these which
heighten their status as contributing members of international society, and bring
forms of prestige.70
Two examples in energy governance include Abu Dhabi’s selection as the per-
manent seat of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009, and
Doha becoming host to the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.71 The vote on IRENA
headquarters was signiﬁcant to the UAE, involved substantial lobbying, and fol-
lowed an oﬃcial proposal from its previous competitor for hosting rights,
Germany.72 Renewables and climate change have received a lot of attention.
Despite alternative energy potential, the region’s primacy in fossil fuels makes this
appear a peculiar focus.73 All Gulf states except Saudi Arabia signed the COP21
Paris Agreement with other UN members in April 2016. Emirati news reported that
the UAE was the ﬁrst Gulf state to ratify COP21 in September 2016, an act that was
brought up in numerous exchanges with interlocutors.74 UN records, however, place
Kuwait’s ratiﬁcation ahead of the UAE’s.75 Qatar’s ratiﬁcation followed later, on 23
June 2017. Qatar appears to be the ﬁrst of GCC and OPEC members to craft a
climate change policy. This occurred in the context of hosting COP18 in November
2012, and was part of an ‘‘ambitious ‘state branding’ programme.’’76
69. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘‘Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses
to U.S. primacy,’’ International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 67.
70. Li-Chen Sim, ‘‘Re-branding Abu Dhabi: From oil giant to energy titan,’’ Place Branding and
Public Diplomacy 8, no. 1 (2012): 95; Mehran Kamrava, ‘‘Mediation and Qatari foreign
policy,’’ The Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 555.
71. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring.
72. The UAE allegedly visited over 100 countries and committed USD 135 million in assistance to the
new organization. Mari Luomi, ‘‘Abu Dhabi’s alternative – Energy initiatives: Seizing climate-
change opportunities,’’ Middle East Policy 16, no. 4 (2009): 113–114; Sim, ‘‘Re-branding Abu
Dhabi,’’ 90–91.
73. Faris Al Sulayman, ‘‘The obstacles facing renewables in the Gulf,’’ Gulf Affairs, Summer 2016, 9–
11; Katarina Uherova Hasbani, ‘‘Dubai: An inspiration for green economy transition in the Gulf,’’
Gulf Affairs, Summer 2016, 12–16.
74. Nadeem Hanif, ‘‘UAE a ‘positive example for Gulf countries’ after agreeing to ratify Paris Climate
Agreement,’’ 6 September 2016, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/environment/uae-a-positive-
example-for-gulf-countries-after-agreeing-to-ratify-paris-climate-agreement-1.226338 (accessed 4
October 2018).
75. ‘‘Paris Agreement – Status of ratification,’’ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
12 December 2016, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (accessed 4 October 2018).
76. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the
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A focus on excellence in aviation facilitates the UAE and Qatar’s roles as pivot
points between East and West, and further entrenches their centrality—especially
the UAE’s—as a regional logistics hub. These states are home to Emirates, Etihad,
and Qatar Airways, which have been called ‘‘the three most dynamic airlines of the
early twenty-ﬁrst century.’’77 They are leading competitors to North American and
European airlines, providing improved connectivity between West and East, and
meeting positive customer service reviews.
Being concerned with gaining status, with domestic economic gain, and with
changing outcomes sometimes appear to be separate goals. However, the means
through which the three are pursued in these cases often reinforce each other.
Status functions as ‘‘a key driver in the policies of small states in the everyday
life of international society,’’78 and economic and status gains strengthen possibi-
lities in foreign policy and exercises in entrepreneurial power. Like Young suggests,
the ‘‘blending of economic liberalism, political authoritarianism and activist for-
eign policy makes for a volatile political identity, underlining the multiple processes
of state-building that are taking place.’’79
The overlaps in signiﬁcant issue areas between the UAE and Qatar are no
accident. A number of Gulf states ‘‘are competing for nation brand hegemony in
the region,’’ with Dubai becoming the most successful at securing mostly positive
messages.80 This is at least partially attributable to oﬃcial and active branding,
hiring PR and lobbying ﬁrms for the purpose of inﬂuencing US public opinion and
policy, and establishing a policy presence in Washington through funding think
tanks and launching their own.81 Such resources are regularly mobilized in the
pursuit of particular foreign policy goals. For example, UAE lobbying was report-
edly inﬂuential in stymieing Canada’s bid for a UN Security Council seat in 2010
after relations between the two soured following a row over airline routes.82 In
2017, Sudan was reportedly removed from Trump’s travel ban after active Emirati
lobbying in Washington.83 Both the UAE and Qatar have been utilizing PR ﬁrms
2012), 4–5, https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/alsabah/al-SabahPaperUlrichsenno3.pdf (accessed
4 October 2018).
77. Ulrichsen, Small States with a Big Role, 7.
78. Carvalho and Neumann, Small State Status Seeking, 1.
79. Young, The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security, 114.
80. Robert Govers, ‘‘Brand Dubai and its competitors in the Middle East: An image and reputation
analysis,’’ Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 8, no. 1 (2012): 48.
81. Yasin Al-Yasin and Ali A. Dashti, ‘‘Foreign countries and U.S. public relations firms: The case of
three Persian Gulf states,’’ Journal of Promotion Management 14, no. 3–4 (2009): 355–374; Eric
Lipton, Brooke Williams, and Nicholas Confessore, ‘‘Foreign powers buy influence at think
tanks,’’ The New York Times, 6 September 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/pol
itics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-think-tanks.html?_r=0 (accessed 4 October 2018); Julian
Pecquet, ‘‘Qatar spends big to counter charges of lax stance on terror,’’ Al-Monitor, 29 August
2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/lobbying/qatar (accessed 4 October 2018).
82. ‘‘UAE lobbied against Canada’s UN bid,’’ CBC News, 14 October 2010, https://www.cbc.ca/news/
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83. Ryan Grim and Alex Emmons, ‘‘How Sudan got off Donald Trump’s latest travel ban list,’’ The
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yemen/ (accessed 4 October 2018).
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and lobbying to improve their image in Western countries since 9/11.
These activities increased through the ﬁnancial boom of the 2000s, and were ampli-
ﬁed again to garner support for their contrasting positions on regional aﬀairs since
the Arab uprisings.84
The UAE has been especially eﬀective in using its wealth to forge an inter-
national reputation and progressive label. Dubai, one of the small but better
known of the seven emirates that make up the UAE, pioneered state-branding.
Through a ‘‘centralised and hyper-entrepreneurial approach,’’ Dubai sought to
establish its image as ‘‘the 21st century global city.’’85 Winning the bid to host
World Expo 2020 was viewed as validation that it had achieved this. Brand Dubai,
‘‘the creative arm of Government of Dubai Media Oﬃce,’’ characterizes Dubai as
cosmopolitan, multicultural, and business-friendly.86 The UAE’s aggressive brand-
ing activities intensiﬁed further in the spring of 2017, when Sheikh Mohammed bin
Rashid launched the UAE Soft Power council—basically an oﬃcial PR council
staﬀed with cabinet members—aimed at reinforcing ‘‘the country’s status and repu-
tation in the world.’’87 This appears to be working. In conversations with foreign
embassies and actors in the UAE, several interlocutors mentioned that the UAE is
viewed as the voice in the region most closely aligned with European norms. The
UAE is considered the party to call for foreign actors seeking consultation on
events in the region. Particularly since the Arab Spring, the UAE has been vocal
on anti-terrorism and the need for a strong hand and stability in the region.
Although Qatar’s branding has seemed less successful than the UAE’s post-
2012, three forms of public diplomacy in the previous two decades raised the
country’s global proﬁle and provided opportunities for exercising entrepreneurial
power. First, Qatar’s cultural, educational, and media activities positioned it stra-
tegically on the region’s cultural map. Al Jazeera’s dominance of the Arab media
landscape since its establishment in 1996 until the 2011 uprisings, and the renown
of its English network during and since, have been signiﬁcant factors; so much so
that Cooper and Momani label Al Jazeera ‘‘Qatar’s most impressive diplomatic
achievement.’’88 These accomplishments raised the ire of Saudi Arabia, as they
highlighted Qatar’s potential as a political rival.89 Indeed, Al Jazeera’s image
decline in the region since 2012 perhaps highlights the vulnerabilities of soft
power instruments.
84. Al-Yasin and Dashti, ‘‘Foreign countries and U.S. public relations firms’’; Momani and Ennis,
‘‘Between caution and controversy.’’
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Second, Qatar’s engagement in sport through pursuing the right to host the
FIFA 2022 World Cup illustrates its desire to be recognized as ‘‘a truly global
sporting destination.’’90 Its pursuit of these goals began earlier, and includes
highly-publicized investments and event hosting. For instance, Qatar Sports
Investment Group purchased Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), and secured Qatari
sponsorship of FC Barcelona (ﬁrst through Qatar Foundation, then Qatar
Airways). Signiﬁcantly, Qatar has hosted major global sporting events, including
the 2006 Asian Games and the 2011 Asian Cup football tournament.91 It is, how-
ever, the World Cup win that has been the focus of negative attention, raising
global attentiveness to the human rights abuses inherent in the international
labour-recruiting networks and domestic sponsorship system. Thus, one of the
risks of these forms of diplomatic engagement or soft power mechanisms is what
Brannagan and Giuliannoti call ‘‘soft disempowerment.’’92 More recently, Qatar
made headlines for facilitating the most expensive player transfer in football his-
tory, securing one of the most recognizable ﬁgures for PSG.93 Such moves can also
be viewed as forms of diplomacy, projecting a business-as-usual image to assuage
fears of investors and political allies over the eﬀects of the regional blockade.
Qatar’s third area of public diplomacy occurs in prominent mediation eﬀorts and
humanitarian aid. Its active foreign policy under Sheikh Hamad was characterized
by a willingness and ability to insert itself as a mediator into wider regional con-
ﬂicts.94 It often coupled economic diplomacy with parallel mediation eﬀorts, as seen
in Palestine, Lebanon, and Somalia.95 Not only was Qatar willing to serve as a
mediator, it had a practice of developing ties with various global and regional
actors and rivals, including neighbouring GCC countries, Iran, Israel, Hezbollah,
Hamas, and the US. This behaviour allowed Qatar to position itself as an impartial
peace broker, but was also controversial.96 Qatar’s reputation for impartiality and its
practice of making itself a useful ally to Western partners facilitated its status as a
90. Paul Michael Brannagan and Richard Giulianotti, ‘‘Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar,
global sport and football’s 2022 World Cup finals,’’ Leisure Studies 34, no. 6 (2015): 703.
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mediator. That Qatar chose sides in many of the Arab uprisings was interpreted as a
sharp break from its previous policy, and undermined its reputation as mediator.97
By demonstrating the various innovations available to states from a diplomatic
toolbox, these three aspects hint toward entrepreneurial powerhood. They also
underline the risks of soft disempowerment. The possibility of reputation recovery
exists, provided the state is equipped with a powerful development narrative and an
eﬀective branding strategy. In Neumann and de Carvalho’s view, while ambitious
small states may masquerade as something larger than they are, they are ‘‘simply
seeking to be acknowledged as a good power.’’98 This can be viewed as a form of
social mobility in state relations. The emulation of ‘‘values and practices of the
higher-status group with the goal of gaining admission into elite clubs’’99 is status-
seeking and competitive behaviour. This is evident in the UAE’s positioning as a
liberal, anti-Islamist partner in the region. Similarly, Qatar’s involvement in political
and humanitarian crises abroad, including aid to Darfur and the US Gulf Coast after
Hurricane Katrina; mediation across the Horn of Africa, in Lebanon and Palestine;
and military intervention or support in Libya and Syria, is illustrative of its desire to
be not only a global citizen but also a globally important crisis responder—as peace-
maker, humanitarian donor, or security if need be. Kamrava suggests that Qatar’s
behaviour as a ‘‘good global citizen’’ is linked to its subtle power.100
Wishing to be perceived as a good power underlies some of the competitive
behaviours within UAE–Qatari relations. Each state has resorted to attempts to
discredit the other’s status as a good power or partner in international aﬀairs, and,
by default, enhance its own status. Disagreements on the direction of outcomes in
the post-2011 MENA context made this apparent, with the UAE regularly diﬀer-
entiating itself from Qatar as the seeker of stability. Qatar, in contrast, positioned
itself as a supporter of regional change, as represented by larger popular engage-
ment and the backing of actors like the Muslim Brotherhood. Both have actively
engaged in media and the US think tank environment—with Qatar arguing that the
Muslim Brotherhood’s variety of political Islam was the region’s best chance
toward democratization, and the UAE vigorously supporting the thesis that the
Brotherhood is a major threat to regional stability. Since the 2017 blockade, infor-
mation warfare between the rivals has become very pronounced.
New territory: Flirting with failure in new power exercises
In the seven years since the onset of the Arab uprisings, the roles of Qatar and the
UAE in shaping outcomes in the MENA have continued to evolve. Balancing
between the pursuit of change and the pursuit of status quo, these two countries
have had ebbs and ﬂows in the rivalry between them, and with Saudi Arabia.
Both countries have developed assertive regional policies toward political
97. Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 151.
98. Carvalho and Neumann, Small State Status Seeking, 2.
99. Larson and Shevchenko, ‘‘Status seekers,’’ 67.
100. Kamrava, Qatar, 63.
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change, and, together with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have backed fellow monar-
chical regimes in the region through the GCC.
In the early days of the Arab uprisings, Qatar projected its inﬂuence relatively
successfully through its use of broadcast, by joining international coalitions like in
Libya, and by endorsing oppositional groups it viewed as the most likely future power-
holders. Both Qatar and the UAE followed Saudi’s lead in intervening in Bahrain to
crush the uprising in 2011. Meanwhile, the UAE capitalized on its reputation as a safe
haven, and began attracting even more regional capital from less stable neighbours.101
It too participated in the Libyan intervention, and across regional conﬂicts moved
decisively against political Islam. Although Qatar under the new Emir initially seemed
to be moving more quietly than under his father, many did not expect this to last. In
the words of two separate Emirati interlocutors, ‘‘Just wait, Qatar will be back!’’ At
the time, this seemed to be an expression of the belief that Qatar would return to its
bolder foreign policy activities. In light of the recent blockade, it could be interpreted
as a view that Qatar would once again bear the brunt of regional ire.
It is evident that branding does not always work as planned, especially in a com-
petitive environment. This was illustrated by the reaction to several of Qatar’s foreign
policy interventions, and in continued negative press over Qatar’s winning bid to host
the FIFA 2022 World Cup. The bid has been embroiled in controversy, ranging from
corruption allegations to a heightened outcry over the treatment of migrant construc-
tion labourers in building FIFA stadiums. The international attention hosting the
World Cup brought to Qatar opened a door for its regional rivals to fan the ﬂames
of suspicion. The example of the Qatari blockade and stalemate reveals the import-
ance of Qatar’s strategy of partner diversiﬁcation for enduring such actions.
Whatever happens, it is too early to speculate on regional outcomes in a space
undergoing a great deal of political upheaval. Policy miscalculations and failures
happen to all states with an active global presence. Both states have demonstrated a
willingness to undertake activities even when costs may be incurred. Betting on
outcomes of dramatic regional change is a risky enterprise, especially when neigh-
bouring entrepreneurial states bet against you. Qatar has most visibly borne the
brunt of policy failures. Its policy shift from neutrality in mediation to choosing
winners in interventions has proven costly. Yet even the UAE, having taken an
active part in the Saudi-led coalition war in Yemen, faces concerns about policy
overreach and failure. When 45 soldiers died in a missile attack in Yemen in the fall
of 2015, the UAE declared a day of mourning and later a National Martyrs’ Day
to commemorate all those who ‘‘sacriﬁce their lives in the line of duty.’’102
Since, its once-vocal engagement has grown much quieter as success appears murk-
ier. Its vocalism has instead shifted to opposition to Qatar.
101. Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky, ‘‘Gulf monarchies in a changing Middle East: Is spring far
behind?’’ Orbis 59, no. 1 (2015): 35–48.
102. Rym Ghazal, ‘‘Martyrs’ Day a fitting tribute to UAE’s heroes,’’ The National, 9 September 2015,
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/martyrs-day-a-fitting-tribute-to-uae-s-heroes-
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Attempts to use military engagements as a symbol of nationalism and unity
are far more complicated than development successes. Developing states are more
likely to embrace leadership on economic trajectories than security ones ‘‘that can
detract from their eﬀorts at internal economic development.’’103 Military engagement
by actors like the UAE and Qatar in regional conﬂicts represented a newer extension
of their power and coalition-building. If the new security territory continues to be
contentious and the cost incurred raises, we may see a recalculation follow.
What will prove important is how actors in the region respond to controversies
and failures. Active branding and lobbying appears to be an eﬀective tool, espe-
cially in the Emirati case. Qatar’s exercises in public diplomacy are complicated by
perceived failures to address its reform promises on its labour sponsorship system,
and its pledges to exercise caution in the support of rebel groups in the region.104
The UAE’s boycott of Qatar is also risky. It has caused sudden and sharp diﬃ-
culties for regional and international businesses based in Dubai—raising questions
about its once-perceived reliability. How these states move forward will be illus-
trative of how meaningful failure is for entrepreneurial powers, and how such
power can continue to be exercised in the face of controversy and competition.
Understanding actor preferences for regional outcomes, the meaning of changing
external security calculations, and the presence of a large domineering neighbour is
critical for interpreting evolving regional dynamics. Building on these assessments,
I suggest that not only understanding the pursuit of status, but also the negotiation
of status among new, small, but loud players in international aﬀairs provides a
crucial angle for interpreting entrepreneurial state behaviour.
Conclusion: States, power, and autocracy
This paper explores the puzzle of oil-wealthy, rentier states exerting entrepreneurial
power in regional and global aﬀairs. It shows how entrepreneurial power in Qatar
and the UAE has been facilitated by the pursuit of status, the construction of
compelling development narratives, and eﬀective branding coupled with ﬂexible
autocratic governing. When power is traditionally discussed in the context of the
Gulf, focus usually centres on security and securitization discourses with a view of
US–Gulf relations. Extending analysis beyond this allows scholars to bring the
Gulf into wider conversations on the changing global political economy and
global ‘‘dispersal of power’’ which has given rise to ‘‘a new layer of ambitious’’
states seeking to craft ‘‘an independent foreign policy proﬁle and clout.’’105
103. Andrej Krickovic, ‘‘‘All politics is regional’: Emerging powers and the regionalization of global
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Although research on Western states has observed that status-seeking abroad is
rarely popular with the public electorate,106 this ﬁnding may operate diﬀerently in
autocratic states that base their legitimacy on a diﬀerent mix than popular electoral
politics—of which there are few. Naturally, it is diﬃcult to measure popularity in
non-democratic political systems, but it is clear that these states expend a great deal
of eﬀort managing popular opinion nonetheless. Powerful development narratives
domestically have become important to image-shaping globally. Autocracy aﬀords
more ﬂexibility in governance and the speed of policy implementation. This can
have positive outcomes, especially in economic development, but appears more
complicated in other issue areas. Managing the discourse around policy change
and intervention becomes especially important.
Using the term entrepreneurial power allows us to explore such dynamics and
think about power through multiple levels of governance. It help us move away from
the strictures that accompany stories of hierarchy, hegemony, and position, to under-
stand how multiple states across world regions pursue diﬀerent forms of power and
outcomes in the international order. Entrepreneurial power is strengthened by its
analytical ﬂexibility, absent restrictions of positional, size, or regime-type descriptors.
It also allows more precision in analysis by facilitating the examination of the diver-
sity and idiosyncrasies which aﬀord an assortment of state power. Moreover, it
contributes to literature on global IR by not forcing comparisons to development
path or expressions of power based solely on examples from the North Atlantic.
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